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Abstract 
 
The policy contribution aims to overcome the unfertile debate that opposes the 
notions of risk sharing and risk reduction, by examining the concepts of economic 
solidarity and responsibility, with a particular focus on the Banking Union and some 
of its unresolved crisis management issues. The contribution adopts a money-centric 
view on banking, which highlights the interconnectedness between monetary policy 
design and the banking sector, arguing that both principles of solidarity and 
responsibility are interconnected and must therefore be included in the architecture 
of the EU’s financial system. The empirical review comparatively examines the EU and 
US cases in order to draw concrete lessons from them. The contribution concludes 
by briefly proposing an enhancement of a solidarity dimension in the Banking Union 
design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 We would like to thank Maria Ana Barata, Matthias Thiemann, and all the participants to the Financial Stability 
Research Workshop carried out in Berlin, on 29 October 2019, for their insights, comments and the overall fruitful 
discussions during the event. We are grateful to Martin Aehling for the overall organisation of the Financial Stability 
Conference and Workshop, and for the generous opportunity to present our contribution.  
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Introduction  
Last year, Daniele Nouy, former chair of the SSM’s Supervisory Board, delivered a speech at the 
2018 Financial Stability Conference entitled Risk reduction and risk sharing – two sides of the 
same coin. When discussing the issue of risk reduction in the banking sector, she posed the 
following question: “when are the risks low enough? In my view, we have reduced risks enough 
for EDIS to start. Now is the right time to set it up. It’s time to consider some solidarity.”2 
Economic solidarity implies the mutual sharing of costs and risks and may involve 
redistribution mechanisms which come at different level—regional, national, and 
international/supranational—and through different means, including taxation and sovereign 
debt management. The present contribution, however, focuses on solidarity mechanisms in the 
European banking sector.  
The risk reduction v. risk sharing dichotomy has dominated the debate around the reform 
of the euro area, being the completion of the Banking Union (BU) with the creation of a common 
European deposit insurance one of its most controversial points. In fact, the debate on whether 
and when these risks are deemed to be low enough, apart from the inherent technicalities 
surrounding the topic, is closely related to euro-area political dynamics which followed the EU 
sovereign debt crisis of 2009-10. In short, “the problem is framed as a contrast between risk 
sharing and risk reduction and yet the more political expressions of these concepts are solidarity 
and moral hazard” (Jones 2019, 37). As highlighted in this recent contribution, Jones (2019, 4) 
explains that the core of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) politics debate now is about 
striking the right balance “between national responsibility and European solidarity” (emphasis 
added).3  
It is interesting to see how advocates of either side have explained the reasoning behind 
the alleged risk-sharing v. risk-reduction dichotomy. On the one hand, Mario Draghi (2018) has 
firmly expressed that “we should not be held back by the distinction between risk reduction and 
risk sharing” for two reasons. First, because of the substantial risk reduction that has taken place 
and the ongoing efforts that are being made in the same direction; and second due to the 
complementary nature of risk-sharing and risk reduction. When commenting on Draghi’s speech, 
Fracasso (2018, 3) explains that the former “convincingly argued that the dichotomy between 
risk-reduction and risk-sharing is, in fact, ‘artificial’ and fallacious in a monetary union where the 
lack of risk-sharing mechanisms is the major source of redenomination and default risks”. On the 
other, and on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, former member of the Executive 
Board of the ECB Jürgen Stark (2019) has argued that “the proliferation of new safeguards has 
introduced a high degree of moral hazard and created perverse incentives for governments and 
 
2 See Nouy’s speech at last year’s Financial Stability Conference 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2018/html/ssm.sp181031.en.html 
3 What his analysis suggests is that the risk-sharing v. risk-reduction, or solidarity v. responsibility, are not just 
contentious points revolving around specific eurozone reform debates but, more deeply, denote the emergence of 
a central constitutional or in Jones’ (2019, 37) words “ethical” dimension  in EMU that is transversal to both economic 
and political analyses. 
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market participants alike” (Stark 2019, 1). From the latter viewpoint, higher-level safeguards are 
expected to encourage if not imply opportunistic behaviours by lower-level private actors and 
lower-level public authorities which are formally required to supervise them.4  
In order to overcome these tensions and provide concrete policy alternatives, the debate 
has mostly concentrated on two different set of proposals. On the one hand, the Franco-German 
CEPR’s Policy Insight (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018) stresses the role of market discipline in order 
to mitigate moral hazard risks (Fracasso 2018). On the other, it has been pointed out that the 
compromise found by these scholars might not be feasible for countries in which the risk of 
governmental debt runs is higher: “even with sound fundamentals, the larger the outstanding 
debt, the higher the risk that market discipline degenerates into a debt run” (Tabellini 2018, 1). 
This side of the debate, indeed, highlights “risks of financial market instability, self-fulfilling crises 
and multiple equilibria in a system where redenomination risks are present and the central bank 
cannot act a lender of last resort for the public sector” (Fracasso 2018, 4). In particular, one of 
the central points of disagreement is the country-specific risk pricing. It is argued that this tool 
might affect the resilience of the euro as a whole, as a confidence crisis striking one country may 
spread to others (Tabellini 2018).  
In light of the conceptual and policy tensions delineated above, this contribution provides 
some key elements for discussion in order to overcome the current stalemate in the development 
of additional crisis management tools in the still-in-the-making Banking Union (BU).5 Our 
analytical framework draws upon a money-centered view of the banking system, which evidences 
the close interconnectedness between monetary policy design and the banking sector (Ricks 
2016). Hence, we believe that a critical analysis of economic solidarity concerning the Banking 
Union architecture cannot leave aside broader monetary-related issues. 
The remainder of our policy paper is structured as follows. The first section disentangles 
the notions of economic solidarity and its complementary responsibility, in order to frame the 
current debate from a broader perspective which may overcome the existing risk reduction vs. 
risk sharing dichotomy. The second section examines crisis management responses and tools in 
the EU: the former focuses on the measures taken by the ECB during the crisis, which will be 
useful in light of the comparative analysis developed in Section 3, while the latter points to the 
main instruments that belong to the post-crisis EU regulatory toolkit, highlighting specific 
shortcomings in the current framework, and the need to introduce further economic solidarity 
mechanisms. The third section focuses the US case, showing how the other major transnational 
and international currency area combines these principles of solidarity and responsibility, in view 
to draw concrete lessons for both EMU and BU. The fourth and last section concludes by 
emphasising how neglected solidarity mechanisms can enhance the Banking Union design. 
 
4 These divergent statements clearly illustrate the antagonistic interpretations of what risk-sharing means. In this 
context, it is important to distinguish between Members States’ debt and potential liability (including those arising 
from deposit insurance schemes) and that of the private sector, as risk-sharing provisions that might apply to the 
former are not necessarily applied to the latter. 
5 Completing the Banking Union is still high in the EU agenda, as explained in the Parliament briefing: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/574392/IPOL_IDA(2019)574392_EN.pdf However, 
the extent to which the EDIS proposal is to be maintained is to some extent uncertain.  
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1. Economic solidarity and economic responsibility  
As anticipated, the contribution aims to go beyond the sterile risk reduction vs risk sharing 
dichotomy. Instead, the work focuses on two higher-level concepts with a view to nurturing a 
richer discussion about viable and better financial infrastructure designs. In fact, behind the false 
and narrow dichotomy between risk sharing vs. risk reduction lays the question of economic 
solidarity and its relationship with economic responsibility.  
Economic responsibility points to the principle that the risk-originator should bear the risk, 
and pay if it materialises, while economic solidarity points to the principle that the actors within 
a system which are exposed to that risk (including the risk-originator) protect each other in case 
of risk realisation. In the context of an economic and monetary union, and now a banking union 
as well, a de facto solidarity emerges from market integration—a solidarity that may be mirrored 
de jure by those non-market institutions that may help coordinate the functioning of markets 
themselves. In order to provide for a balanced institutional design, both principles should be 
considered and included in the architecture of the financial system. The way in which they are 
combined is a matter of institutional design, given that the proper incentives should be 
introduced in order to encourage risk-originators to prevent and manage risks properly. At the 
same time, all the parties should be given the necessary guarantees about system integrity, 
system resilience and systemic risk protection over time and circumstances. 
The principle of economic solidarity and its necessity is closely related to single market 
integration, which is a core feature of the EU project. In any event, even if the single market has 
provided its general framework, the main driver of financial integration has been the EMU 
(Draghi 2019). In simple words, “an interlinked banking system within the Euro area provides an 
insurance mechanism against regional liquidity shocks. However, the flip side of the coin is that 
interbank claims bring about a risk of financial contagion, i.e. increase the systemic risk” (Fecht 
and Grüner 2005, 1), while financial crisis can have different effects based upon the patterns of 
interconnectedness (Allen and Gale 2000). The material flow of payments that is performed 
across credit institutions over the EU through the TARGET2 platform, along with the 
interconnectedness stemming from free movement of capitals and cross-border lending and 
borrowing, feature the EU banking ecosystem, generating structural interdependence among the 
local ecosystems in each of the Member States (Biondi 2018a). This structural interdependency, 
portrayed in Figure 1 below, argues and claims for policy coordination and solidarity mechanisms, 
which are essential to every monetary and banking union. 
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Figure 1: TARGET2 balances in the eurozone from 2001-2019. Source: Euro crisis monitor 
http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
The question of economic solidarity in the EU has been treated from different perspectives. 
For example, a relatively recent special issue has been devoted to the examination of the 
“European Community of debt” (Frerichs 2017), which in turn has focused on the ongoing and 
yet open “process through which debt and solidarity have become transnationalised and 
Europeanised, […] undermining existing communities of solidarity or creating new networks of 
solidarity, de facto and de jure.” (Frerichs 2017, 720/733). Understanding the steps that have 
fostered the transnationalisation of debt and related risks make the intricate relationship 
between public debt management and risk-sharing concerns in the banking sector more explicit, 
therefore paving the way for a more comprehensive approach to the mutualization of risks– that 
is, a macro-prudential or systemic one -  that transcends country-specific understandings.  
In fact, the current Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD)6 already sets the basis for 
a voluntary transnational solidarity mechanism amongst member states, with the provisions 
related to voluntary lending (Art. 12). It is also informative to highlight that the principle of 
 
6 Directive 2014/49 EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes, 
OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149-178.  
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solidarity is embraced in the aforesaid DGSD, more explicitly, recital no. 37 states as follows 
(emphasis added):  
Deposit protection is an essential element in the completion of the internal market 
and an indispensable complement to the system of supervision of credit institutions 
on account of the solidarity it creates among all the institutions in a given financial 
market in the event of the failure of any of them. Therefore, Member States should 
be able to allow DGSs to lend money to each other on a voluntary basis.  
Moreover, the principle of solidarity has been also explored by a recent volume by Schelkle 
(2017), in which the notion of monetary solidarity is largely examined from a political economy 
stance. She argues that the risk-sharing capacity of the monetary union has not been used at its 
maximum and this does not come from “some ideal of a ‘complete and genuine union’, as two 
major EU reports put it (van Rompuy et al. 2012, Juncker et al. 2015), but from an understanding 
of what would be minimally required to resolve the current crisis, specifically by interrupting the 
negative feedback loop between the insolvency of banks and sovereigns.” (Schelkle 2017, 44).7 
She further stresses the intrinsic commitment problem raised by risk-sharing: when a 
contingency occurs and hurts some members of the pool, those that have not been affected 
might be reluctant to maintain their promise to “share the pain”. The monetary union raises 
similar burden-sharing issues, and given the uncertainties underlying these arrangements, these 
commitments remain implicit until the unknown circumstances materialise. Hence, “the 
promotion of financial integration through a common currency can be seen as having created a 
commitment for all members to insure each other if integrated markets fail systematically.” 
(Schelkle 2017, 54).  
The commitment to which Schelkle refers to, however, can be jeopardised by the lack of 
concrete risk-sharing mechanisms. This was exactly what happened during the euro area crisis 
when “solidarity disintegrated because it was not deeply entrenched in EA institutions, allowing 
markets [i.e., creditors] to force austerity on vulnerable economies. Crisis management thereby 
caused risks to be shifted onto the weakest, rather than sharing those risks” (Schelkle 2017, 196, 
emphasis added). This passage highlights the link between precarious institutionalised solidarity 
mechanism and the pressures towards austerity policies, which refer to and enforce the principle 
of responsibility for single exposed Member States in isolation.  
Schelkle (2017) also notes that the design for specific solidarity mechanisms is related to 
the perception of the underlying risk: whether it is framed as bad luck, bad behaviour, or manifest 
disadvantage. In fact, she points out that those institutional arrangements framed as insurance 
“tend to be politically more robust and generous than those constructed as assistance. Social 
insurance has elements of both. The stress on insurance enlists citizens into a community of fate 
(shared risk), whereby the unlucky receive transfers from a common fund. The stress on social 
(assistance), by contrast, provides for transfers from the non-poor to the poor” (Schelkle 2017, 
 
7 As a matter of fact, the so-called “doom-loop” constitutes an inevitable nexus between money supply and public 
debt management. Therefore, such ”bank-sovereign nexus is less a vicious circle than a consequence of this 
institutional organisation of governmental debt refinancing and its quasi-monetary nature.” (Biondi 2018b, 2, intra 
text reference omitted).  
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59). This distinction between the underlying assumptions beneath social insurance and social 
assistance is fundamental to better understand the much-alluded lack of political will to engage 
in additional solidarity mechanisms. 
The following section provides an overview of some of the crisis responses from the ECB 
and the tools that have been introduced within the crisis management framework in the EU 
thereafter.8 In spite of the extensive regulatory and institutional changes, some fundamental 
problems remain. As summarised by Schelkle (2017, 225), “the reforms since 2009 have extended 
risk sharing but did not do away with, in particular, the limits on fiscal risk sharing. This keeps the 
threat of negative feedback loops between banks and sovereign alive and, under extreme stress, 
tends to concentrate risks on the weakest links.” This statement points out to the need to 
complement responsibility with solidarity channels given that, as explained below, the solely 
integration of financial markets cannot provide the necessary stabilising mechanisms in a 
currency (and banking) union. The statement also points out to a deeper issue directly related to 
the de facto solidarity implied by market integration, and the need to complement it with non-
market mechanisms in order to enhance coordination and resilience in case of systemic crisis.  
 
2. Crisis management responses and tools in the EU: What role for solidarity 
mechanisms?  
This first part of this section aims to spell out the actions taken by the ECB as a consequence of 
the financial and subsequent fiscal and sovereign debt crises in the EU. The analysis of the policy 
responses of the euro area central bank has a dual purpose. First, it serves as an anchor point for 
the subsequent comparison with the US case explained in Section 3 below; second, it highlights 
the downside of the lack of institutionalised solidarity mechanisms in the eurozone. The second 
part of the section complements the previous one by focusing on the post-crisis reforms crisis 
management tools, and their current shortcomings.  
2.1 Crisis management (i): ECB responses between the mandate straitjacket and 
emergency non-standard measures 
Central banks can respond to a deteriorating economic and financial environment with various 
types of actions, including liquidity provision and interest rate guidance policy. After the outbreak 
of the global financial crisis, central banks were relatively quick to undertake the former type of 
action; however, the speed with which the latter was activated varied in the US and euro area 
cases.9 In fact, it would be misleading to simply focus on the different approaches followed by 
these authorities as a response to similar shocks, without considering the legal and institutional 
 
8 Although some mechanisms only comprise eurozone Member States.  
9 As explained by Mody and Nedeljkovic (2019, 1): “The US Federal Reserve reduced the policy rates sharply at the 
onset, in September 2007, and then, starting in December 2008, began forward guidance and asset purchases. In 
contrast, the ECB waited until October 2008 for its first interest rate reduction and thereafter injected active stimulus 
only hesitantly. Of the ECB’s liquidity interventions, a crucial component was the provision of dollars obtained 
through swap operations with the Fed.” 
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frameworks surrounding their field of action. Concerning the US, Section 2A of the Federal 
Reserve Act setting the monetary policy objectives, includes the maintenance of “long run growth 
of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to 
increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”. On the contrary, the Protocol on the Statute of 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the European Central Bank states in Article 
2 that “the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice 
to the objective of price stability, it shall support the general economic policies…”. In addition to 
the different scope of the mandate, further restrictions on the ECB are enshrined in Arts. 123 and 
125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the prohibition on monetary 
financing, preventing “the central bank from taking actions which would directly finance 
government spending” (Mersch 2016) and the colloquially called “no bail-out clause” according 
to which Member States cannot take on the debts of another Member State, respectively. 
Starting with the US subprime mortgage crisis, and the subsequent 2007-2009 recession, 
the financial catastrophe soon broke out in Europe, where it triggered unprecedent fiscal and 
sovereign debt crises. While by 2008 the US had deployed all of the tools enumerated in Table 
3.1 below, the ECB intervened in October of the same year with its first interest rate reduction, 
“and thereafter injected  active stimulus only hesitantly” (Mody and Nedeljkovic 2019, 1).  
The Securities Market Programme (SMP) announced in May 2010, and the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) announced in August 2012 and further specified in September of 
the same year come into place (the red measures from Figure 2.1.a below). As further elucidated 
below, it is important to highlight the slow and to some extent inconsistent response from the 
ECB in these phases of the crisis, when compared to the US seen above. The empirical data 
assessed by Mody and Nedeljkovic show that, while dollar liquidity provisions obtained through 
swap operations with the Fed were beneficial to lower the bond spread of periphery country 
governments, the same could not be said of the provision of euro liquidity, which had a limited 
effect on the reduction of bond spreads in Portugal, Ireland and Spain between October 2009 
and September 2012. 
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Figure 2.1.a: Key ECB policy measures, July 2008 to October 2012. Source: Mody and Nedeljkovic (2018, 30). Authors’ 
note: The figure reports timeline of the key liquidity and active policy measures implemented by the ECB (bars) and 
the path of the ECB main reference rate (solid line). 
 
The timeline in Figure 2.1.a, highlights the main policy interventions only until November 
2012. The series of ad hoc interventions continued evolving until our days. Only by 2014 the ECB 
started to consider a set of interventions in line with the quantitative easing programme which 
has been conducted by the FED since 2008, and the UK since 2009-10 (Biondi 2016). Figure 2.1.b 
depicts the slow and hesitant response of the ECB referred to above, compared to the Bank of 
England, the FED, and the Bank of Japan QE expansion during the period 2007-2017.  
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Figure 2.1.b: Central Banks’ balance sheets 2007- 2017. Source: The Economist (2017). 
The response measures taken by the ECB between 2009 and 2013 were relatively slow and 
insufficient. Further intervention would then be needed to improve the overall situation in EU. 
In June 2014 the interest rate paid on banks’ deposits was taken to – 0.1 % and two important 
programmes were announced: first, as part of a credit easing package, the targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTRO-I), which aimed at purchasing covered bonds issued by the banks; 
second, a new asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) (Praet 2017). Hence, “in 
January 2015 the Governing Council announced the expanded asset purchase programme (APP), 
which included a large-scale purchase programme targeting public securities (PSPP).” (Praet 
2017, 4). The impact of the ECB’s PSPP on the share of government bonds held by national central 
banks is depicted in Figure 2.1.c below, which shows an increase “from around 5% to 15-20% of 
total outstanding government bonds” from 2015-2018 (Baltensperger and Call 2018).10 The 
deposit rate continued to go down, at a -0.4% back then, and in early 2016 a TLTRO-II was 
announced in order to support credit availability to firms and households. Finally, the TLTRO-III 
programme was announced in March 2019, and consists of a series of seven targeted longer-
term refinancing operations, each with a maturity of three years, starting in September 2019 at 
a quarterly frequency.11 
 
10 Further research may compare this ongoing held of outstanding Member States bonds with that of securities 
issued by European financial institutions. 
11 Source https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/tltro/html/index.en.html 
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Figure 2.1.c: National central banks holdings of domestic sovereign bonds (% of total outstanding sovereing bonds, 
selected countries). Source: Baltensperger and Call (2018), elaborated from the Bruegel sovereing bond holdings 
dataset.  
This brief succession of policy efforts in order to provide monetary stimulus have not been 
completely successful. This has been partly the consequence of an incomplete EMU design and 
lack of political willingness, mirrored by the lack of concrete solidarity mechanisms that could 
enhance integration potential. In fact, one of the main aims of these interventions has been to 
both mitigate banks’ dependency from their sovereign bonds of residence, and reduce bond 
spreads across Member States. However, “in the absence of collective safety nets, national 
supervisors tried to protect their domestic banking systems and thus created externalities for 
others. The example also shows how this lack of coordination during a crisis leads to risks being 
shifted onto the weakest parts of an incomplete union.” (Schelkle 2017, 301, emphasis added).12 
 
12 Interestingly, a recent analysis of safe assets supply in the euro area (Gros 2019, 175), points out to the fact that 
the supra-nationalisation of banking supervision via the SSM has not done away with some fundamental home 
biases, which reinforces the idea that without proper ex ante solidarity mechanisms in place, some eurozone banks 
will still hold their governments’ debt no matter the higher yielding of peripheral bonds: In the past, one could argue 
that the German (or French) supervisor exerted moral suasion on German banks not to hold any ‘peripheral’ 
sovereign debt. However, most of the German banking system is now supervised by the Single Supervisory 
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This problem is a concrete expression of a lack of coordination, which echoes and is closely 
related to a lack of solidarity mechanisms in action. Other paradoxical features of the EMU case 
in this regard are that while some fiscal capacity for risk sharing has been created, support for 
distressed member states was extended only under stringent conditions. So while fiscal capacity 
was being limited in such cases, at the same time the ECB announced its ability to lend indirectly 
to sovereigns.13 “The banking union showed a similar pattern: on the one hand, it made a big 
step forward in creating the world’s biggest jurisdiction of harmonized banking supervision in 
terms of financial assets, with the ECB at its helm; yet at the same time fiscal backstops for bank 
resolution are minimal and a European deposit insurance scheme has not yet come to pass.” 
(Schelkle 2017, 25).  Hence, the incompleteness and lack of better institutionalised solidarity 
frameworks are still present, in spite of the advancements in other aspects. 
2.2 Crisis management (ii): Current tools and their regulatory shortcomings 
After outlining the complementary features between economic solidarity and responsibility in 
light of the interconnectedness of the EMU and BU, and the crisis management responses from 
the ECB, this section provides a review of the crisis management tools for credit institutions and 
the indicative moment in which they are activated. There is a distinction between solvency and 
liquidity, in order to identify the main policy purpose, and another distinctive criterion concerning 
liquidity in resolution, in light of the specific issues that this blend category entails.14 In fact, as 
explained below, financing resolution is a key aspect in light of the resolution objectives 
delineated in Art. 31 (2) of the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD),15 being the 
continuity of the institutions’ ‘critical functions’ the main among others. This review highlights 
the orientation of the current framework and areas that have received less attention. Some of 
the most important regulatory efforts have focused on dealing with solvency in distressed times, 
as witnessed by implementation of wide resolution powers and mechanisms.  
In spite of being analytical tools of reference, the liquidity and solvency issue requires some 
caveats. In uncertain times, the two concepts overlap and mingle together: as a matter of fact, a 
bank perceived as insolvent becomes illiquid due to lack of interbank credit, and a temporary 
illiquid bank becomes insolvent due to missed payment obligations which trigger a trust crisis 
 
Mechanism (SSM), which is the supervisory arm of the ECB. But little seems to have changed in the domestic 
concentration of government bonds holdings by German banks”. 
13 Chiefly through Draghi’s renowned 2012 announcement. See 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html 
14 In fact, in a recent report on the BRRD and the SRMR, the Commission clearly stated that it  “strongly supports the 
ongoing reflections on other sources and solutions for the provision of liquidity support in resolution and calls for 
these to be agreed upon and implemented in the course of 2019. It is important that resources of sufficient scale 
are available to provide short-term liquidity support, where needed” (European Commission 2019, 8)  
15 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 
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(essentially a bank run). Although the blurred lines between liquidity and solvency have been 
especially acute in the context of the global financial crisis of 2007-08. 
To make a quick but instructive comparison with another global financial crisis of 1929-32, 
a 1939 paper commenting on the US Baking Act of 193516 expressed that these two concepts 
become “practically synonymous terms” (Morton 1939, 272). In fact, “it is assumed that the 
Federal Reserve will be willing to loan on assets at the same value listed in the bank statement. 
To make any other assumption would be imputing to the regulatory officials a desire to keep 
insolvent banks open at the risk of depositors. The distinction between liquidity and solvency 
disappears. Any bank which the examiners now say is solvent is also liquid. Immediate liquidity 
is simply "rediscountability" and long run liquidity is identical with solvency” (Morton 1939, 281). 
Therefore, the inclusion of mechanisms that help channelling economic solidarity ensure 
system integrity and continuity in uncertain times, reducing the actual materialisation of risks 
and hence the need to resort to resolution mechanisms. Table 2.2 below provides a conceptual 
framework that describes the main phases through which credit institutions go in the run-up of 
a crisis, and links the phase with the policy tool that is activated. In case of a systemic crisis, 
distinguishing between illiquid and insolvent financial entities—which in normal times could be 
solved by a lender of last resort (LORL) intervention—becomes much more difficult. However, it 
has to be borne in mind that one thing is the resolution procedure that defaulted financial entities 
might go through, and another thing is the existence of monetary and financial mechanisms that 
aim to prevent or at least mitigate the effect of systemic losses, including the prevention against 
distressed financial entities going into default.  
  
 
16 This Act aimed at completing the restructuring of the Federal Reserve initiated during the crisis time, in which 
earlier legislation was meant to be emergency measures. See 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking_act_of_1935 
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 TOOL INTERVENTION PHASE 
LIQUIDITY17 Regulatory requirements 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR, Articles 411-426) → Liq. buffers/Net 
liq. Outflows over 30 days 
Net Stable Funding Ratio18 (NSFR, Articles 413, 427-428, 510) 
ILAAP: key risk management tool  
Supervisory authorities in the course of SREP exercise.  
 
 
 
 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)  Provided by a Eurosystem national central bank to financial institutions facing 
liquidity problems but solvent and on the basis of adequate collateral.19 
 
 
 
ILLIQUIDITY 
Early intervention measures (e.g. require the institution’s 
management to draw up an action programme or to change the 
institution’s business strategy or its legal and operational structure; 
replace institutions’ management)  
Supervisory authorities can use them “where an institution infringes or, due, 
inter alia, to a rapidly deteriorating financial condition, including 
deteriorating liquidity situation, increasing level of leverage, non-performing 
loans or concentration of exposures”-art. 27.1 BRRD 
SOLVENCY Regulatory requirements 
1. Own funds ratios: own funds divided by total risk exposure 
amount: 
- Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1): 28-29 CRR 
- Additional Tier 1 (AT1): 52 CRR 
- Tier 2 (T2): 63 CRR 
2. PLUS: P2R + Buffers + P2G  
3. ICAAP: key risk management tool 
Supervisory authorities in the course of SREP exercise.  
Capital add-ons: most important power  
 
 Precautionary recapitalisation (not applicable during FOLTF 
institution)  
Provision of own funds to a solvent institution, Article 32(4)(d)(iii) 
BRRD/18(4)(d)(iii) SRMR), subject to state aid framework approval and of a 
temporary nature, among others. 
 
 
INSOLVENCY 
Direct Recapitalisation Instrument (DRI) Provided by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to credit institutions 
posing a serious threat to financial stability and unable to meet capital 
requirements.  
 
17 Central bank liquidity management is executed through open market operations (OMO), which “consist of one-week liquidity-providing operations in euro 
(main refinancing operations, or MROs) as well as three-month liquidity-providing operations in euro (longer-term refinancing operations, or LTROs).” These 
measures have been complemented by three other non-standard monetary policy measures: the three-year maturity LTROs, the targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTROs) which provide financing to credit institutions for periods of up to four years, and the Asset Purchases Programme (APP). 
Source: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html. Further analysis of the tools deployed during the global financial crisis and 
the sovereign debt crisis are discussed in Section 3.2 below.  
18 This is one new requirements from the recent banking package, as explained in the following European Commission’s Memo: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-19-2129_en.htm  
19 See the 2017 Agreement on ELA: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/Agreement_on_emergency_liquidity_assistance_20170517.en.pdf 
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FINANCING 
RESOLUTION 
Different sources: market, normal central bank facilities; if those 
resources are temporarily insufficient, the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF) might be used → given the extent of the potential liquidity 
needs in resolution, the SRF, even if supplemented by a backstop, 
may not be sufficient to adequately address these needs.20 
 
 Loss internalisation mechanisms → resolution tools could be 
considered within this category:  
• Sale of business  
• Asset separation  
• Bridge institution 
• Bail-in 
Power to write down or convert capital instruments is activated (art. 59 
BRRD)  
 External financing mechanism 
• National resolution financing arrangements (art 99 BRRD) 
→National resolution funds that in the case of eurozone 
MS is the SRF; borrowing between them or mutualisation 
in case of a group bank 
• DGSs 
• Government financial stabilisation tools (GFSTs): Arts 37 
(10), 56-58 BRRD.  
Can be activated when the internalisation of losses cannot absorb them all. 
In the case of GFSTs, they are applied to FOLTF institutions within the 
resolution procedures.  
The 2013 Banking Communication considers state aid as last resort and 
burden-sharing as a key aspect. Importantly, the intervention and scope for 
involvement of DGSs is not fully clear in light of the annulment of the 
Commission’s decision in Tercas.21 
 
20 These points were highlighted by the Commission’s 2019 report referred to in footnote 14, which relied on external publications that analysed the financing 
of resolution procedures.  
21 Judgement in Joined Cases T-98/16, Italy v Commission, T-196/16, Banca Popolare di Bari SCpA v Commission, and T-198/16 Fondo interbancario di tutela dei 
depositi v Commission. The European Commission has appealed against the Court’s ruling, since in their view the decision has departed from  settled case law 
on the topic. The decision from the Commission, however, underscores the existing tensions when it comes to crisis resolution tools and the lack of coordination 
and explicit solidarity mechanisms.  
Table 2.2. EU Supervisory and Resolution crisis management tools in response to liquidity and solvency issues. Source. Own elaboration. 
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Table 2.2 schematically differentiates between the responsibilities held, on the one hand, 
by supervisory authorities, e.g., in relation to early intervention tools and powers and, on the 
other, on resolution authorities, which manage the recovery and resolution of FOLTF 
institutions.22 While mapping these crisis resolution tools, it is important to make explicit the 
connection between the DGSD and BRRD when, for instance, recital no. 15 says that “DGSs should 
also assist in the financing of the resolution of credit institutions in accordance with Directive 
2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council.”23  
In relation to some of the specific instruments detailed in the table, the question of the SRF 
and the alternative resolution financing methods is a fundamental one. According to Schelkle 
(2017, 220), the small sum covered by the fund might indicate that the purpose of the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is that of “establishing a clear hierarchy of loss absorption: the bail-
in rule puts bank shareholders and creditors (other than insured deposit holders) first in line.” 
However, the problem under analysis goes beyond loss absorption; the question is instead 
related to the system resilience and its capacity to deal with systemic risk. In fact, this type of risk 
has a specific nature that makes it different from idiosyncratic shocks, which may affect a single 
institution without rippling out into the whole system (Haldane and May 2011). The magnitude 
and characteristics of the phenomenon, therefore, call for preventive financial and monetary 
tools capable to complement more standard risk-reduction and loss-absorption measures, which 
might intervene too late to avoid a systemic disruption (Biondi 2018a). The interconnectedness 
portrayed by the money-centric view on banking, also speaks to how liquidity and insolvency are 
closely intertwined and why preventive and resilience-oriented tools (subsumed here as 
preventative solidarity mechanisms) are preferred to ex post loss absorption ones. 
An important aspect that explains the core of the problem is summarised by Schelkle when 
explaining that “instead of merely monitoring the use of the commons, EA [euro area] institutions 
have started to protect it from devastation by financial markets”, and that although the Banking 
Union has represented a major step towards integration, “the fiscal backstops that have been 
developed still do not rest on joint liability but on separate national guarantees. The formal 
obligation for every member to contribute is a form of risk pooling but a relatively weak one, 
 
22 The smooth articulation between liquidity and solvency phases—albeit clearer from a theoretical perspective but 
harder to assess in practice—calls for a precise and coordinated transition between supervisory and resolution 
authorities. For recent and practical considerations about this cooperation mechanisms, see the following speech 
from Edouard Fernandez-Bollo Member of the SSM’s Supervisory Board available at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2019/html/ssm.sp191115_2~4942253071.en.pd
f?27ad275d649d58546220242d09f077cd 
23 This also highlights the fact that DGSs fulfil a broader function other than the pay-box one. In fact, art. 11 details 
the different uses of the funds: Art. 11.2 use of funds: The financial means of a DGS shall be used in order to finance 
the resolution of credit institutions in accordance with Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU. The resolution authority 
shall determine, after consulting the DGS, the amount by which the DGS is liable. Art. 11.3 (a): Member States may 
allow a DGS to use the available financial means for alternative measures in order to prevent the failure of a credit 
institution provided that the following conditions are met: (a) the resolution authority has not taken any resolution 
action under Article 32 of Directive 2014/59/EU. 
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subject to a commitment problem of the guarantors.” (Schelkle 2017, 27/31, emphasis added). 
This summarises the idea of the missing solidarity mechanisms within the institutional design. 
Furthermore, “there has been a shift in the underlying paradigm, but the institutional assignment 
of policy competences has not done away with the fiscal taboo.” (Schelkle 2017, 223, emphasis 
added). This is important as it highlights the fact that, in spite of the fundamental supra-
nationalisation of competences, the more fundamental fiscal issue has not changed; 24 hence, we 
are still far from a third order policy change à la Hall (1993).25  Another fundamental aspect is 
that sovereign debt is purchased in proportion to each country’s relative size, therefore, it does 
not allow for a more targeted support—which again reinforces the point of a lack of paradigm 
change in spite of the crisis-related events. 
The idea of both an EMU that still needs to be “completed”, and the  Banking Union’s 
“completion”, point out to the fact that the current monetary and financial frameworks lack the 
necessary mechanisms in order to deal with a de facto solidarity implied by the Single Market. In 
fact, the two “incompleteness” can be thought of as part of the same continuous phenomenon: 
“the agreement on BU can be seen as a response to the asymmetric design of EMU—a Monetary 
Union with a limited form of Economic Union—and to the fragmentation of the Single Market in 
financial services” (Howarth and Quaglia 2019, 24). The still-under-construction Banking Union 
given the (back-then called) missing “third pillar” (EDIS) proves the difficulties of dragging 
solidarity-related decisions. The IMF (2018, 7) has expressed that “the bank crisis preparedness 
and management framework faces significant transitional and structural challenges . . .  [and that 
an] effective resolution will depend in part on the ready availability of adequate financial 
resources, so it is essential to . . .  establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS).” 
Nevertheless, what this contribution aims to convey is that EDIS, albeit and important piece in 
the BU puzzle, is neither the only nor the main tool towards building up stronger economic 
solidarity mechanisms. As the following section shows with the US example, the 
institutionalisation of public risk-sharing mechanisms has been a fundamental precondition for 
the development of stronger private risk-sharing ones. 
 
 
24 For instance, in spite of the massive QE programme launched by the ECB in 2015, the risk sharing logic has not changed, and 
thus most of the fiscal risks are still borne by the national central banks, as elucidated by the ECB in an explainer section of its 
website (Schelkle)In fact, only a “20% of the purchases fall under the regime of full risk-sharing”, according to the Q&A explainer 
available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/asset-purchase.en.html. The document also specifies, 
after explaining that the Governing Council decides the extent to which losses incurred by national central Banks are to be shared 
within the Eurosystem, that “the Internal loss-sharing mechanisms in no way undermine the singleness of our monetary policy.” 
(last accessed 30 September 2019).  
25 Hall’s seminal paper aims to explain the policy learning process by distinguishing three kinds of policy changes: a 
first order change displays incremental features, which are associated to the standard policy process; in a second 
order new policy instruments are developed, moving a step forward in the strategic action direction; and the third 
order implies a paradigm change policy. “First and second order change can be seen as cases of "normal 
policymaking," namely of a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given policy 
paradigm, much like "normal science." Third order change, by contrast, is likely to reflect a very different process, 
marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a "paradigm shift." If first 
and second order changes preserve the broad continuities usually found in patterns of policy, third order change is 
often a more disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy.” (Hall 1993, 279).  
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3. The US framework: An illustrative and comparative example  
This third section provides an empirical review of how the principles of economic solidarity and 
responsibility have been framed and shaped in US. The comparison with the US has been chosen 
for two main reasons: first, both the dollar and the euro are global or reserve currencies and 
second, both jurisdictions are part of a banking union. Therefore, examining how the US puts into 
action—either explicitly or implicitly—economic solidarity principles, proves valuable for the 
diagnosis of gaps in the current monetary and banking unions.  
The first part focuses on the mechanisms deployed by the Federal Reserve since the 
outbreak of the global financial. The comparison between the EU and US cases aims to highlight 
the fact that central banks play a crucial role in guaranteeing the coherence of both the banking 
and the monetary systems, by focusing on the liquidity dimension and debt monetisation. The 
second part analyses specific mechanisms present in the US system that help reinforce the 
solidarity dimensions, and the way in which the American framework strikes a public-private 
balance.  
3.1 The Fed’s response: Bagehot revisited 
As anticipated in Section 2.1 above, there have been stark differences between the ECB’s 
reaction and the measures deployed by the Federal Reserve. In fact, as a response to 
“extraordinary circumstances, central banks may well need to take measures to prevent systemic 
collapse that are unprecedented in their details” (Madigan 2009, 8), but that might nevertheless 
be congruent with central banking principles.26 One of these policy innovations has been the 
need to lend to nonbank financial firms, “with the hope and expectation that such action would 
be sufficient to stave off financial collapse”; refusing to lend would have implied accepting a 
systemic failure (Madigan 2009, 4). Table 3.1 below shows in fact that the shadow banking system 
was “at the center of the government’s emergency policy response”, and that “every major 
category of private-money claim was specifically targeted with emergency stabilization 
programmes in 2008” (Ricks 2016, 98/99/101). What is also clear from the table is that most of 
the emergency responses directly aimed to the stabilisation of the short-term funding market.  
Private money claim category Emergency policy measure 
Money market mutual funds shares MMF guarantee (Treasury) 
Money market investor funding facility (Fed) 
Uninsured deposits  Transaction accounts guarantee (FDIC) 
Term auction facility (Fed)  
Deposit insurance limit increase  
Eurodollars  Central bank liquidity swaps (Fed) 
Financial and non -financial 
commercial paper  
Temporary liquidity guarantee programme (FDIC) 
Commercial paper funding facility  
Asset-backed commercial paper  ABCP MMF liquidity facility (Fed) 
Primary dealer repo Primary dealer credit facility (Fed)  
Term securities lending facility (Fed) 
 
26 Which would entail abiding by “Bagehot’s dictum” but reinterpreting it in light of the circumstances and the major 
changes in financial market structures that occurred from 1873 to date.  
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Other measures directed to the 
banking and nonbank sectors 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) composed by 
the Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP), and the 
Debt Guarantee Program (DGP).27Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) 
Table 3.1: The US Policy response. Source: Adapted from Ricks (2016, 100) 
The massive institutional response in order to stabilise the short-term debt market points 
to a key issue: the fact that modern banking is essentially a monetary activity. As recalled by Ricks 
(2016), this is not necessarily the way in which theories of banking and bank runs models have 
understood the question in the last decades. This “money—centric theory of banking” (Ricks 
2016, 91), provides the key to understand the ways in which economic solidarity functions in the 
US, as discussed below; it also makes the link between the monetary and the banking union more 
explicit and the need to provide the system with further instruments in order to complement the 
current crisis toolbox.  
 
3.2 Solidarity in action: the public-private arrangement and US Treasury securities as safe 
assets  
Ricks’ (2016) The Money Problem elucidates how the Central Bank plays a fundamental role in 
making sure that both the banking and the monetary systems work coherently. As earlier 
mentioned, our starting point is the close interconnection between monetary policy design and 
the way banking operates, summarised as a “money—centric theory of banking”. The direct 
implication of this approach is acknowledging that banks do satisfy aspects of money demand 
and thus the standard picture of banking mechanics and its abstract considerations in bank run 
models might not portray the current system accurately. In fact, he criticises the generic 
conception of banking as financial intermediation given that, although this notion might seem 
sophisticated and in line with the current times, “it ends up unmooring banking law from its 
logical foundations and depriving it from internal coherence” (Ricks 2016, 210).  
The previous sections have focused on the measures deployed during crisis times—and in 
the euro area case those in place until today. This section examines the mechanisms that entail 
forms of solidarity in the regular framework. In this sense, we explore the following features of 
the US framework: first, the use of public debt instruments as quasi-monetary assets; second the 
so—called “public private partnership” (in Ricks’ words) that was born as a result of the Banking 
Act of 1933 establishing a deposit insurance, and its functioning across time.  
The first aspect relates to the quasi-money nature of public debt, which is depicted in Figure 
3.2 below. This figure represents the money premium on short term Treasury bills, which “shows 
that yields on short-term Treasuries are much lower (i.e., prices are higher) than such an 
 
27 These programmes were created to extend additional FDIC guarantee to newly issued debt instruments. This was 
done under the Debt Guarantee Program (DGP); the unlimited deposit insurance coverage would come under the 
Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP). “Together, the DGP and TAGP made up the FDIC’s Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), which was designed to preserve and enhance the liquidity of the banking 
system during a time of crisis” (FDIC 2017, xvii). 
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extrapolation [of the rest of the yield curve] would predict . . . [and] this moneyness is a function 
of low interest-rate risk” (Ricks 2016, 44). What this implies is that high-quality short-term debt 
instruments that are not medium of exchange are equally relevant when it comes to money 
demand. What the curve represents is that the larger the spread, “the greater the monetary 
content of the instrument” (Ricks 2016, 46). The predominance of cash equivalents other than 
currency and checkable deposits show that drawing a “moneyness line” is sometimes not 
possible, and points towards the interconnectedness between debt monetisation and monetary 
base management (Biondi 2018a) 
 
Figure 3.2: The money premium on short-term Treasury bills. Source: Ricks (2016), taken from Greenwood et al. (2015).  
 
The second aspect relates to the formation of the public-private-partnership. The starting 
point of this joint conception of the banking system was the result of the 1929 crisis, by the 
enactment of the 1933 Banking Act. This regulation represented a major step forward in the 
development of modern banking rules, by means of which the federal government was made 
“the explicit guarantor of the bulk of the baking systems’ monetary liabilities” (Ricks 2016, 162). 
It was the explicit acknowledgement that money supply, when represented by insured deposits, 
constitutes a public good; and within the insured perimeter, money was considered a sovereign 
obligation, even if the task of issuing monetary instruments in exchange for credit assets was 
outsourced to private banking firms. 
 
In this sense, “the United States was the first country to introduce a national deposit 
insurance system. After decades of debate and largely adverse experience with moral hazard in 
state-level schemes, Congress enacted federal deposit insurance in 1933 in the midst of a banking 
crisis. The goal of the insurance was more to restore confidence in the liquidity of bank deposits 
than to protect small depositors (Golembe, 1960).” (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2002, 176, 
emphasis added). This goes in the same direction as Ricks (2016), when explaining the FDIC’s 
success. In his view, deposit insurance has been primarily viewed as a tool to protect smaller 
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depositors. However, “the consumer protection perspective is at best incomplete; at worst, 
misses the point” (Ricks 2016, 216). When citing one of the sources that analysed the antecedents 
and historical remarks of the Federal Deposit Insurance in the US, Ricks (2016) stresses that bank 
obligation insurance has a monetary function, “and the protection of the small creditor against 
loss is incidental to the achievement of the primary objective” (citing Golembe 1960, 189 as well). 
This is not to disregard the importance of protecting individual investors; however, this policy 
aim has not been at the core of the creation of the Federal insurance, in light of the historical 
sources referred to.28  
 
Perhaps one of the main concerns raised against such approach is the question of market 
discipline, and the disincentive in the hands of insurance claimants that have no interest in 
actively monitoring the activities of their respective credit institutions. This, in fact, is to some 
extent a fallacious argument that originates from the equation of money markets and stock 
markets, which are intrinsically different: unlike stock markets, money markets are “about 
obviating the need for price discovery” (Ricks 2016, 215, citing Holmstrom 2015). A similar point 
has been put forth by Gary Gorton, when describing the role of what he calls “information 
insensitive” debt, which constitutes “debt that no one need devote a lot of resources to 
investigating”, as it has been precisely designed to avoid that (Ricks 2016, 215, citing Gorton 
2010, 23).  
 
Regarding the complementarities between the individual protection and the system 
stability perspectives, the first 1994 Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes at the back then 
Community level, pointed out to the same direction. In fact the 1994 document, out of five times 
in which the word stability is used, four are connected to individual protection, which evidences 
that these two policy aims were considered in tandem, for instance: “in the interest both of 
consumer protection and of the stability of the financial system”, “stability of the banking system 
and depositor confidence”, “stability of the banking system and protection for savers”. This is an 
acknowledgement of the fact that system-wide concerns cannot be overlooked, even if the 
abovementioned Directed has been enacted by the time EMU was not in place yet and the 
Banking Union concept was still unimaginable. 
 
Coming back to the 1939 paper that analysed the reforms introduced by the 1935 US 
Banking Act, it is interesting to note the point of equilibrium that this public—private partnership 
aims to achieve: “what the new regulations really do is to protect banks against loss due to 
"temporary" conditions in the bond market but not to ultimate losses due to poor judgment—a 
rather sensible program” (Morton 280, 1939). This, in fact, constitutes the “art” of central 
 
28 Far from being theoretical claims, this was indeed put into practice in the midst of the financial crisis of 2007-09, 
when the cap on deposit insurance covered was directly removed, and hence a 100% was insured. In line with Ricks’ 
explanation, this meant that the government stopped worrying about the macroeconomic effects of bank failures, 
which constitutes one of the main benefits of system-wide tools capable of bringing systemic risk and its contagion 
mechanisms to an end. In the EU case, the coverage issue is much more delicate issue. In fact, the lack of a 
harmonised coverage amount as we have today within the framework of Directive 2014/49/EU has led to a series of 
announcement between late September and early October 2008 by several EU Member States that promised a full 
coverage to their local depositors, which has led to destabilising consequences for some of them.  
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bankers, which is complemented by solidarity mechanisms and further incentive alignment tools. 
Examples of the latter are the tools used to stabilise and control private money creation by the 
banking system, such as system’s portfolio constraints and capital requirements, which “serve a 
function of loss absorption and incentive alignment, thereby counteracting the effects of moral 
hazard” (Ricks 2016, 210).  This points directly to the “moneyness line” mentioned above in 
relation to Figure 3.2, which illustrated the connection between debt monetisation and monetary 
base management.  
 
The final section of the contribution provides an overview of policy alternatives and 
provides some tentative concluding remarks.  
 
4.  Policy alternatives and tentative concluding remarks  
 
The  present contribution has highlighted the need to complement the principles of economic 
solidarity and economic responsibility. In light of the intricacies between monetary policy and 
the functioning of the banking system, solidarity should be considered in both EMU and Banking 
Union designs respectively. The international experience illustrated by the use of governmental 
securities as safe assets, as well as ex-ante mutual insurance funds in the US case, supports this 
view. Leaving aside international comparisons, the case is that the current crisis management 
mechanisms at the EU level are not fully prepared to deal with systemic risk and the reality of 
financial market integration. The lack of formalised solidarity mechanisms raises additional 
questions in relation to institutional responsibility for the implementation of said solidarity. In 
fact, ECB’s actions during and after the crisis, have shifted the whole of the responsibility burden 
on this single institution, which has made fundamental decisions with an extensive redistributive 
impact, whose impact however is empirically contested29 
In some cases, solidarity mechanisms are already available but there is a lack of political 
and institutional will to put it into practice. This is the case of the voluntary lending procedure 
set in Art. 12 of the DGSD, which has not been transposed by all Member States in light of its 
 
29 Recent studies aiming at quantifying the impact of various ECB’s programmes on sovereign bond yields have shown 
different results, depending on the programme under analysis and whether the studies focused on the 
announcement or the implementation phases. For instance, Chadha and Hantzsche (2018, 2)  claim that “the 
announcement of ECB quantitative easing benefitted the euro area periphery more than the core. This is because it 
helped reduce uncertainty about the future stance of monetary policy and confirmed the commitment of the ECB 
to support a recovery in the euro area as a whole. However, estimates are small compared to those obtained for the 
ECB programmes that aimed at reducing euro area break-up risk, namely the SMP and OMT programme. Core 
countries benefitted from the APP mainly through a small but statistically significant signalling effect on the risk-free 
rate.” Ansgar and Gros (2019, 21) distinguish between the different phases and claim that “the ECB’s bond buying 
programme might have lowered rates when it was announced, but the impact was transitory” in the case of 
peripheral countries. Furthermore, “QE in the euro area was special because most of the sovereign bond purchases 
were undertaken by NCBs on their own account. Previous empirical studies of the PSPP have usually neglected this 
institutional fact, which is key to understanding the behaviour of risk spreads” (Ansgar and Gros 2019, 21, emphasis 
added). This shows that a deeper exploration of institutional responsibility when it comes to solidarity and the 
management of ECB holdings and related profits and losses may be addressed by further research. 
 
Research Workshop  Financial Stability Conference 2019 
    
 23 
 
non-mandatory language. The possibility to transform the current voluntary scheme into a 
mandatory one is an alternative to the mutualisation of funds via EDIS. We are not implying that 
the political consensus would be easily achieved; however, this is a concrete option to channel 
economic solidarity without the costs of changing the existing institutional architecture. As put 
forth by Draghi (4, 2019): 
Deepening public insurance by completing the banking union and strengthening fiscal 
union is not about creating a transfer union. It is about creating a euro area in which 
there is less need for public risk-sharing in future, because we have the instruments 
in place to stabilise crises more quickly, and because we have the right framework to 
allow private sector risk-sharing to develop more sustainably. 
In order to tackle the factual and occasionally dysfunctional30 solidarity created by 
integrated markets, some of the measures normally advocated for might not be sufficient. For 
example, albeit backstops have been proposed as a way forward, they can have limitations and 
prove burdensome when it comes to implementation. In addition, the use of resolution tools 
and/or the DGSs’ payout function occurs too late and comes along with uncertainties in relation 
to their implementation too. 
The main objection to de jure solidarity mechanisms is the possible fostering of 
opportunistic behaviours by private actors and national governments. But moral hazard may be 
prevented by providing for a layered mechanism that introduces individual controls and private 
shared insurance funds before the intervention of guarantees from central actors, such as 
Treasuries and Central Banks. The Guarantee-providing Funds must be able to intervene and be 
trusted to be able to do so independently from the eventual stepping-in of resolution tools, which 
might intervene too late and may accentuate uncertainty in distress times. Such layered 
mechanisms leave local actors to cover for each other, but backed by local central actors as a first 
instance, and eventually EU institutions as the last resort, with smooth and quick coordination 
between the latter two. Another related point is that, in spite of the options set forth in the DGSD, 
the role of national deposit insurances has been limited in some cases to the pay-out functioning 
only, thus leaving little room for the provision of support when needed.31 
The present contribution does not certainly advocate against financial market integration; 
the message it conveys is that the reality and objective of (financial) market integration needs to 
be complemented by non-market institutions that provide stabilisation and compensation in light 
of the consequences triggered by monetary and banking integration.  In fact, “financial market 
integration is supposed to reduce the transmission of output volatility into consumption volatility 
in a straightforward way. However, monetary and financial integration may unsettle domestic 
 
30 Dysfunctionality can be mirrored by the fact that during expansionary phases, capital flows circulate and create  
masses of debts and credits that go well-beyond the capacity of Member States institutions to manage them. The 
problem is that when crisis hits, the lack of ex ante defined solidarity mechanisms is capable of triggering a systemic 
crisis. 
31 Issue that still needs to be clarified given the annulment of the Tercas decision, making the intervention of DGSs 
rather uncertain.  
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credit and savings intermediation, thus destabilizing both output and consumption 
independently.” (Schelkle 2017, 75).32 
The question that any EU framework needs to surmount is how to cope with diversity and 
heterogeneity of the members, which proved to be a challenge in order to mobilise the necessary 
solidarity during the set of crises. In fact, it might be even harder now: “after the veil of ignorance 
has been lifted, insurance is no longer possible: ex-post compensation and redistribution are 
required (Schelkle 2017, 196).”  In light of the two “incomplete” Unions—EMU and BU—and the 
current proposals that aim to deepen market integration through the Capital Markets Union 
(CMU), it is fundamental to take the implementation of solidarity mechanisms seriously if we 
want to avoid the consequences of a dysfunctional integration.  
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